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THE APPRAISAL OF THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL

PARTY'S PERFORMANCE IN THE 2007 JAMAICAN

GENERAL ELECTIONS:

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PREFACE

The loss of the 2007 Jamaican General Elections by the People's National Party after an

unprecedented eighteen years in office provides a moment for sober reflection and consideration.

The margin of defeat - less than 3000 votes nationally and two seats preventing a tie in parliament

- is remarkable and ran counter to the views of many of the pundits in the days preceding the vote.

Yet, in the first-past-the-post Westminster system, a narrow loss is a defeat nonetheless. It is a time

for considering what might have been ‘if only' this or that administrative or political decision had

been taken; but it is also a time for a deeper reflection that points in the direction of healing,

reinvention and renewal. The thrust of this report, it is hoped, captures both of these dimensions.

Some six weeks ago, in the immediate wake of the Elections and the decision of the Party, this

Appraisal Team met with representatives of the Executive and were given the daunting task of

producing a review and appraisal of the Party's performance in the campaign and the Elections in

time for the meeting of the NEC in the third week in November. I can say with some satisfaction

that we have completed the main body of that report.

Beyond the obvious time constraints, the task has not been an easy one. We began with the fairly

evident observation that we would have to look at a sample of constituencies and twelve were

eventually chosen. However, getting to these twelve and meeting with all the requisite officers of

the Party in the rainiest rainy season in many a year, proved equally daunting. We eventually met

with seven constituencies in some depth, while receiving reports from others and from a number

of constituencies that were not a part of our original sample. Despite these shortfalls, the

methodologists will no doubt agree that an over ten percent sample is more than adequate to

provide useful insights into the perspectives of the membership of the Party. A further aspect of

the report, agreed on at the very first meeting, was to commission a national poll to solicit views on

the Party and the campaign that go beyond those coming from within the Party itself. As events

unfolded, it was clear that this would not be ready before the date of the NEC meeting in

November. We have therefore agreed to present its findings as a report in its own right, in which

the Appraisal Team would reconvene and append its comments to the actual poll results. This has

also given us reason to pause and consider more broadly the nature and format of the report.

One of the recurring comments coming from our conversations with Party members is expressed

in the fear that after giving their heartfelt comments and opinions on the elections and the future

of the Party, that the Report, no matter how well intentioned, might simply be tabled and put on

the shelf to gather the proverbial dust. We start with the assumption that the Executive and the

Party, while under no obligation to agree with all the proposals made, are interested in generating a

conversation and out of it, consensus and regeneration in the Party and its organs. As such, we

suggest the following sequence of events as an appropriate approach to the further dissemination

and exploration of this report:

1. Appraisal Team Report submitted to Executive.

2. Executive considers Report and takes it to NEC

3. Appraisal Team submits National Poll and Report to Executive.

4. Party considers Report and decides on implementation.

5. Implementation.

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Essentially we are suggesting that the Report be considered as a process that is not complete until,

after due deliberation and modification, the accepted proposals are implemented.

I wish to end with an expression of gratitude, shared by all members of the Team for the privilege

of being involved in this project. Despite the expenditure of significant personal time and

resources, it was worth every minute. It gave us a deep insight into the heart and soul of the

People's National Party; its officers, members and supporters, their hopes and dreams for a better

Jamaica and their vision that the PNP is the central vehicle in that journey. This in the end is what

the entire adventure is about and why we are all involved.

Brian Meeks

Professor of Social and Political Change

Director, the Centre for Caribbean Thought

The University of the West Indies, Mona.

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1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE APPRAISAL

1.1 Rationale and Structure

Following the Jamaican General Elections held on September 3, 2007, the current results are that

the People's National Party holds 28 seats. Of the 34 formerly PNP seats, 27 were retained and the

Party won an additional seat. The JLP holds 32 seats. Overall the victory of the JLP is considered

the narrowest by seat count in Jamaica's electoral history. The Party acknowledged that there are

external factors including the concerns about the functioning of the electoral system and the level

of funding which the JLP expended not only on their campaign but directly targeting voters in

certain battleground constituencies. Notwithstanding this, the Party concluded importantly that

there should be a focus on the review of the elements over which the Party had direct control.

To undertake the appraisal exercise the People's National Party agreed to assemble a multidisciplinary

external working team to undertake the field work, including focus groups and other

surveys, and prepare a report on the findings of the review process.

The persons selected to serve on the Appraisal Team are considered to be independent persons,

though sympathetic and supportive and who are familiar with the broad principles and objectives

of the People's National Party. They are not involved in any of the formal structures of the Party

and had no role in the development of policy and programmes for the September 3, 2007 General

Elections.

The Appraisal Team consisted of five (5) professionals drawn from academia and the private

sector. The recommendations were signed off by the Officers of the Party, the Party Executive

and subsequently presented to the September 23rd 2007 meeting of the National Executive.

Brian Meeks, Professor of Social and Political Change and Director of the Centre for Caribbean

Thought in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona, was named as the Chairperson of the

Appraisal Team.

Richard Crawford, Lecturer at the University of the West Indies in Politics, Public Administration

& Governance, is a political commentator, analyst and former Special Assistant to Prime Minister

Michael Manley. Mr. Crawford served as Deputy Chairperson for the Appraisal Team.

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Winston Davis For retired Assistant Registrar at the University of the West Indies, Mona and

former Ambassador to Cuba.

Mark Golding was recently named by the People's National Party as a Senator. He is an Attorneyat-

law and partner of the firm Hart Muirhead Fatta, and also has extensive experience in

investment banking having been a founder of Dehring Bunting & Golding Limited.

Aubyn Hill, due to work constraints was unable to participate in the process.

The Team received logistical support from Maureen Webber and her team. Maureen Webber is a

Development Consultant, Principal of the consulting firm Development Options Ltd. She also

served for three years as Deputy General Secretary with responsibility for Organising and Political

Education.

In addition to the Appraisal Team the Party named an Appraisal Committee which included

membership from its Regions, its arms and affiliates, in addition to a representative of the Parish

Managers and Campaign Managers who were involved in the 2007 General Elections.

1.2 Scope of the Work

Six broad areas for possible review were proposed:

o Candidate Identification

o External Environment

o Campaign Strategic Planning, Programme & Management

o Message, Marketing & Media

o Fundraising & Financing

o Election Results

The appraisal was expected to include a review of the candidate identification and support process;

and the process of developing and articulating the Campaign Strategy at the national and local

level. It would determine the extent to which there was a comprehensive national campaign

programme and the necessary campaign management and organization to direct the strategy and

implement the programme.

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The appraisal was expected to assess the process of developing the Party's campaign platform, the

impact it had on the electorate and the overall communications and marketing strategy. The

Appraisal would further assess the effectives of the fundraising process and the extent to which

budgeting supported campaign strategy. Finally, in order to assist in determining how the above

elements affected the results, there was to be a detailed review of the voting results, with breakouts

for Divisions, where possible by income cohorts.

At its first meeting in early October, it was apparent to both the Appraisal Team and the officers

of the Party present that in order to present a report at the required time of the third week in

November, a survey of the Party across the sixty constituencies would be unrealistic. The target

instead was to review a sample of constituencies for a more focused report that would include

recommendations for action in all critical areas and for presentation at the November NEC.

Please see Appendix V.1 for detailed scope of work of the Appraisal Process.

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2.1 Research Process

The Appraisal Team used a series of research and data gathering techniques, including focus

groups with various Party members and supporters; interviews with senior Party Officers. In

addition Campaign Managers, Candidates, Cluster Managers and Party Workers were interviewed.

Survey instruments were used to collect data; detailed analysis of voting results and comparisons

with historical data in addition to a national poll, work on which got underway only recently.

Specifically there were three (3) components:

Qualitative Data Collection

• Conducting interviews with Officers and the National Directorate of the Campaign
• Conducting interviews with workers at all levels, candidates, campaign managers, cluster

managers, campaign/election day workers

• Conducting focus groups with special interest groups, voters, media etc.

Quantitative Data Collection

• Collecting quantitative data from Party workers, including cluster managers and campaign

managers

• A National Poll [Work began on November 16th 2007]
• Reviewing and analyzing data results for both the 2002 and 2007 election.

Documentary Research

• The review of relevant documents of the Party, the EOJ, etc.

2.2 Field Research

i) Selection of Constituencies

There was consensus that it would not be possible to conduct detailed field research in all sixty

(60) Constituencies. The Appraisal Team developed a list of some fifteen Constituencies which it

felt had experiences which reflected the majority of the constituencies. From this, a final listing of

ten was submitted to the Party Executive and to the Party Appraisal Committee. This led to

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suggestions for an additional two (2) constituencies to be added to the list. The twelve

Constituencies were:

Region 1

North West St. Ann

Region 2

Western St. Mary

Region 3

South East St. Andrew

Eastern St. Andrew

West Central St. Andrew

Region 4

South East St. Catherine

North Clarendon

North West Clarendon

Region 5

Central Manchester

South East St. Elizabeth

Region 6

East Hanover

West Central St. James.

The Regional Representatives on the Appraisal Committee were expected to assist the Appraisal

Team in communicating with the selected Constituencies. For a rationale of the twelve

constituencies selected please see Appendix ‘V.3'.

It was agreed that Regions would ask Constituencies not included in the sample to conduct their

own Appraisal and provide this feedback to the Appraisal Team. Packages with copies of the

instruments were prepared and dispatched throughout the Party by the Secretariat.

ii) Survey Instruments

The Team developed survey instruments to be completed by Campaign Managers and Cluster

Managers from the twelve Constituencies. The instruments were ‘piloted' at the Campaign

Managers joint session and received feedback from those present including representatives of the

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arms and affiliates and the regions. Please see Appendix V.4 & V.5 for copies of the survey

instruments.

iii) Interviews

The Team members conducted ‘one on one' interviews with the Officers of the Party, including

the Party President, the General Secretary, three of the four elected Vice Presidents, the Party

Chairman and former Party President. In addition there were individual interviews with all three

members of the National Campaign Committee - the Campaign Director, Deputy Campaign

Director and Campaign Manager - which had the responsibility for directing and managing the

election. Interviews were also held with the two Campaign Administrators.

Please see Appendix V.2 for a schedule of interviews.

iv) Joint Sessions/Focus Groups/Submissions

These were conducted with:

• Campaign Managers - six of the sample of twelve Constituencies attended this session.

Campaign Managers were asked to complete a survey instrument and subsequently

participated in an extensive discussion around the key issues of campaign strategy,

direction and management. The session shared lessons learnt and best practices.

• Candidates - A total of five (5) Candidates of the selected twelve (12) constituencies

participated in an in-depth focus group session. The emphasis was on sharing experiences,

best practices and lessons learnt.

• Cluster Managers & Workers

The team held meetings with seven (7) of the twelve constituencies, which were targeted

for detailed review. The seven constituencies were:

West Central St. Andrew

Eastern St. Andrew

South East St. Andrew

South East St. Catherine

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Central Manchester

Eastern Hanover

West Central St. James

Sessions were held with both Party Workers and Cluster Managers. The Cluster Managers

were asked to complete the survey instrument. A total of fifty-five of these were

completed. In addition to the seven above, Region 4 also organised a session which

brought together Cluster Managers and some Campaign Managers from five St Catherine

constituencies for an in-depth interview session.

The time available for the completion of the field work, compounded by extensive periods

of heavy rainfall made it extremely difficult to complete in-depth reviews of all the chosen

Constituencies. Several were also in the process of preparing their own reports. The

exercise, however, was conducted in an atmosphere of openness and frankness. Let no one

suggest that PNP comrades are afraid to express the strongest possible views, whether

supportive or critical of local and national leadership or of the Party in general. Please see

Appendix "II.3" for a summary of the results from the surveys.

• Middle Income Voters - A total of thirteen (13) Party supporters with an age range of 32

- 54, and a mix of seven female and 6 males from varied professional groups participated

in a focus group session. The group shared their views on the Party's performance and

made recommendations for the next steps.

• Submissions

The Appraisal also sought input from the Arms and Affiliates of the Party. The PNP YO,

PNP WM and the NWU. Both the PNP YO and the NWU were asked and agreed to

schedule ‘focus group' sessions of their primary constituents, the Appraisal Team would

attend once scheduled. The PNP YO President had confirmed as session however, the

assigned member of the Appraisal Team went to the venue and despite waiting for 60

minutes no one arrived. The NWU representative to the Appraisal Committee contacted

the Team's co-ordinator, to schedule a date however at this time the field work was

completed and it was agreed that he would speak with the Chairman of the Appraisal

Team.

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Unfortunately the PNP WM Representative was unable to continue her tenure. We were

advised of the replacement and did make efforts to contact.

A final appeal was sent to all Arms and Affiliates. Submissions were received from PNP

UK and the Jamaica National Movement, Inc.

In addition Party supporters did informal canvassing to gather views of voters and

forwarded these to the Appraisal Team.

Please see Appendix "V.2' for a schedule of interviews.

iv) National Poll - The Appraisal Team viewed the commissioning of a National Poll as a critical

component in the Appraisal Process. The team in consultation with the Appraisal Committee

agreed that the issues to be explored in the National Poll would include, among others:

Why persons voted for the Party

Why they did not vote for the Party

Leadership

Performance

The role of violence

Perceived Corruption

Money and its impact on the election results

Gender patterns of voting

Age patterns of voting

Social/class patterns of voting

Geographical patterns of voting

The results of the Poll will be available in the weeks following the submission of this document.

The Appraisal Team will, however, reconvene and submit its comments on the poll findings as

part of the overall report.

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3. NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE PRELUDE, THE ELECTIONS AND THE RESULTS

On December 12, 1944 the first elections under full adult suffrage were held in Jamaica. The JLP

won 22 seats, the PNP won 5 and Independents won 5 seats. In 1949 the PNP won 13 seats with

43.5% of the vote whilst the JLP won 17 seats with 42.7% of the vote. Since 1944 the PNP has

won 8 National elections and the JLP 7.The two parties have basically rotated in power for roughly

two terms each between 1944 and 1983.

After winning in 1989 the PNP effectively broke this two term cycle by achieving four consecutive

victories over the last 18 years, the last in 2002.

After its defeat in the 1967 General Elections, the Party conducted an appraisal of the reasons for

the loss. This led to significant changes in the Party's organisation and structure and contributed,

among other factors, to the stunning success in the 1972 polls. Following the traumatic defeat in

1980, there was a sustained programme of political education and the re-building of the election

machinery which led to a very strong and committed party that won the elections of 1989, 1993,

1997 and 2002.

After the 1992 Presidential election it was "hard to manage" but former President Patterson

focused on the challenges and party unity because "I have a government to run".

By 2001 in the NE St Ann bye-election, there was the first crack in the dyke. Voluntarism showed

signs of dramatic decline. The party structure and organization began to weaken, affected,

certainly, by the absence of a political education programme since 1992.

After the long and expensive 2006 Presidential campaign, it was felt that the party was "in an

unprecedented positive position, in terms of national popularity. It did well for the party in terms

of generating energy, fervour and exuberance. We could not lose an election at that point". The

Party Leader had a national popularity rating of 78% amongst the electorate at this time.

However, "let's face it if you have an 80% rating in a plural democracy there is only one way for it

to go and that is down. So why the long wait?" The Party began to suffer from post-Presidential

contest disunity, problems associated with the re-verification process for some 260,000 potential

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electors, a turbulent candidate selection process and lack of money. Organizational weaknesses and

a lack of cohesiveness came home to haunt the Party.

Then there was the cement crisis, the prolonged Whitehouse Sandals issue, the voluntary

resignation of the Party's Treasurer Dr. Vin Lawrence, the attacks on the media and attacks by the

media. Yet at first, the Party remained ahead of the JLP in national polls.

The PNP had a highly successful Annual Conference in September 2006 which was partially

eclipsed by the Trafigura affair. Trafigura had devastating consequences for the Party and led to a

rapid decline in popular support.

The JLP which had been campaigning, expecting an early election, used the Trafigura issue to put

more pressure on the Party and Government. They were able to hold a very successful conference

in November and began to emerge as a genuine alternative for many, especially as their campaign

became more vigorous and aggressive

As the Party presented 58 of its candidates in November, Cricket World Cup unfolded. With the

polls showing the PNP still ahead, there was speculation about a December election. This,

however, never materialized as there was great concern about the state of the Party's organization,

campaign machinery and the absence of money.

By March 2007 the situation improved. With the Budget Debate and the first anniversary

milestone of the election of Portia Simpson Miller as President, the position in the polls improved

and another victory seemed possible.

The JLP, however, were not sitting idly by and stepped up its campaign. Millions of dollars were

being spent on a well coordinated media blitz and "despite anything that people might say the

questions of colour, race, social and income status still loom large in Jamaica". The JLP campaign

began to influence popular opinion and gradually tilted the party standings in its favour.

In spite of all of this, the Party's Half Way Tree meeting in early July was a phenomenal event, with

some suggesting the largest meeting in modern Jamaican politics. This surge among core

supporters could have led to an end of month election to keep the momentum in favour of the

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Party. At this time the Party had a minimum lead of six percent over the JLP in all the credible poll

findings.

However, the August 27 date made the campaign too long, deflated the comrades, put more stress

on an exhausted organization, opened the door for more JLP money to flow to the electorate, gave

them more time to decimate the PNP with their media campaign, conflicted with established backto-

school traditions and opened us up to the possibility of a hurricane, which did come.

After Hurricane Dean, there was the confusion surrounding the change of date of the election, the

date for the opening of schools, the impasse between the government and the EOJ, the declaration

of a state of public emergency, the handling of hurricane relief efforts, the seeming confusion

between the Government and Party leaving the field wide open for the JLP to campaign and

capitalize on these events.

The elections of September 3 ended with a 31 to 29 seat victory for the JLP, moved to 33 to 27

and standing at the moment at 32 JLP, 28 PNP. There were 405,215 votes for the JLP and 402,275

for the PNP. The JLP received 2940 more votes than the PNP in one of the most heavily financed

elections in Jamaican history. This, incidentally, is also probably the most heavily researched, the

most media intensive, and the one with the most widely disseminated knowledge about the

electorate's probable intentions. The use of selective "surgical violence" and intimidation was,

while not unique, nonetheless characteristic of these elections. Approximately 40% or 528,734

voters of the total electorate of 1,336,214 did not vote.

In 2002 the PNP won 34 seats with 396,590 or 51.6% of the votes and the JLP won 26 seats with

360,718 or 46. 9% of the votes. In 2002, 59.06% of the electors voted and a similar 40.94% did not

vote. Importantly, in 2007 the PNP gained more votes than it did in 2002 in WR. St Andrew (817),

WC St Andrew (439), ER St Andrew (1586), W. Portland (1173), SE St Mary (744), WC St James

(1236), SE St Elizabeth (913), yet lost all these seats. Increased majorities were also registered in SC

St. Catherine (1663), EC St. Catherine (1347), SE ST Catherine (487), C. Westmoreland (1000), and

N. Trelawny (1000); whilst E. Hanover's increase of 878 was just enough to take that seat from the

JLP.

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The issue of incumbency in this election was of great interest, as polls indicated that a number of

incumbents from both parties, were in danger of losing their seats. The public was dissatisfied with

their performance and the PNP MP's had the added difficulty of "being in office too long" with

what some argued was little to show for their representation. By July 7, 2007 the Party's assessment

showed a rating of 10 safe PNP seats and 10 to the advantage of the PNP. These were all won.

These ratings also showed 19 seats for the JLP, which they won. The remaining 21 battleground

seats showed that incumbents won in N.E. Manchester, (Dean Peart); South Manchester, (Michael

Peart); N.W. St. Catherine (Bobby Pickersgill); S.C St. Catherine, (Sharon Hay-Webster); and S.E.

St. Andrew, (Maxine Henry-Wilson). These wins are attributed to detailed, meticulous and hardworking

campaigns from proven candidates.

The Party was also able to retain S.E. St. Catherine, S.E. St. Ann, Central Westmoreland and

Central Manchester again primarily because of excellent hard working candidates and a united

team. D. K. Duncan captured Eastern Hanover from the JLP for the same reasons. The Party lost

West & S. E. St. Mary after hard fought campaigns; S.E and S.W. St. Elizabeth were lost in part

due to internal divisions and highly contested candidate selections. The North and North West

Clarendon seats were part of our original sample, but we were unable to speak with the candidates

and workers and cannot therefore arrive at a definitive conclusion as to the causes of defeat.

In the immediate pre-election campaign, the Party commissioned three national surveys, one

Gleaner survey and 74 surveys in 46 constituencies which showed: a downward trend of support

for Portia, tight constituency races and the clear indication that it would be a close election. The

Party members and supporters in the weeks before the election did tremendous work "however,

the fact that we came so close both in terms of seats and votes, suggests that we could have won

without making so many mistakes".

That statement is in dire contrast to the pundits who predicted a landslide for the opposition, 45-

15, 50 -10, or even as much as 54 - 6. Were some of these pundits part of a clever strategy by the

JLP to demoralise PNP voters? Certainly there was evidence of some of the classic techniques of

dis-information, and plain "yellow journalism" in elements of the JLP's media campaign. The

mysterious shooting up of the JLP candidate's car in Tavern (E. St Andrew) and the too quick and

‘spontaneous' response of the JLP propaganda apparatus is one fairly suspicious instance.

Numerous questions remain to be posed: Why did the JLP with all the money, media and the

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powerful slogan "Time for a change", come so close to losing after 18 years in power for the PNP?

Why did some of the greatest beneficiaries of PNP policies and encouragement, openly support

and finance the JLP campaign? This is part of the purpose of this appraisal.

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4.0 THE INTERNAL FACTORS BEHIND THE PARTY'S PERFORMANCE

Beyond the disappointment of losing the 2007 general elections, a total assessment of the Party's

performance must address centrally, the closeness of the final result in both total votes and seat

count. Two questions emerge from this. After some four years of JLP campaigning, much of that

time without any competition in the field, with unprecedented, lavish campaign expenditure at

both the national and constituency levels, after all the scandals directed against the Government

and the Party, most of all, after a record eighteen years in power, what accounts for the narrowness

of the JLP victory? A second question, however, must inevitably be posed. After the overwhelming

sentiments indicating support for the new Prime Minister, after the concomitant improvement in

the PNP's standings in the polls in the middle of 2006, what accounts for the precipitous fall in

support and corresponding recovery of the JLP to the point where it became once again

competitive and actually able to win? The answers to these two questions as posed to the

leadership, membership and supporters, sheds significant light on the reasons for the Party's

overall performance. There was, somewhat surprisingly, consensus on many issues, though by no

means on all.

4.1 The Media/Public Relations Campaign

There was strong support for the view that the Party's media campaign was the worst in recent

history. It failed to develop distinctive and effective slogans. The slogan ‘a vote for X is a vote for

Portia' not only failed to convince many hard core PNP supporters who felt it undervalued the

local candidate and the Party, but turned off others, particularly from the middle classes and

professional strata. Further, by focusing almost exclusively on Portia, it provided the opposition

with a single image to tarnish, in order to bring the entire Party down. ‘Not Changing Course' was

seen by the PNP hard core as a fighting slogan, but by many others as an unwillingness to consider

any changes at all and thus a failure of the imagination, at a time when what was required was new

and imaginative thinking.

The debate between the two party leaders was seen unanimously as a major loss for the PNP.

Many felt that it would have been better to suffer the negative publicity of not participating rather

than suffer what was seen to be an inevitable defeat on Golding's strongest ground. The Party

failed to capitalise on the real gains made in the social and economic spheres as well as the

significant advances in national infrastructure during its eighteen years in power.

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The actual media and public relations organization was severely criticized. The failure to utilize

tried and tested individuals, the absence of a press centre at PNP HQ, the absence of a clear and

authoritative Party representative to manage day-to-day relations and information flow with the

media, the failure to utilize the new media, the Web, You Tube, etc., the inability to respond

effectively and creatively to JLP attack ads, the inability to produce catchy and effective jingles and

the failure to present the successful policies of the Government, were among the criticisms raised.

There was some improvement in the last two weeks of the campaign, but by then it was an

instance of ‘too little, too late' as the JLP had already dominated the airwaves and effectively won

the media war.

See Appendix I.1 & I.2 for more details.

4.2 The Presidential Elections

The vast majority (80% Cluster Managers and Party Workers) agreed that the Presidential elections

had a profound effect on the campaign, but there were different emphases. There was an almost

unanimous feeling that its prolonged and intensely competitive nature wasted energy and money

that was urgently needed for the general elections. There is a strong current throughout the party

that deplores the entrance of money and US-style electioneering that began in recent Vice

Presidential races and was carried over with gusto into the Presidential election. There is the

widespread feeling that had the presidential race been more confined within the Party then some of

the excesses of rhetoric that has led to subsequent tensions and provided damaging Opposition ad

content might have been avoided. This is not to deny that there is very strong criticism of those

individuals and groups perceived as having contributed to an exacerbation of differences and

tensions within the Party.

4.3 Disunity

Most of those interviewed felt that disunity played some role in the defeat. This took a number of

different forms. Some felt that other leaders of the PNP did not support Portia by appearing with

her on the campaign trail and did not participate in the campaign as energetically as they should

have. Others argued that the nature of the campaign, focused on a single person, effectively

excluded other leaders, who became redundant. The symbolic persistence of two colours, orange

and yellow, was often invoked as evidence of the failure to reunite the Party after the bruising

Presidential campaign. Whatever the ultimate truth, the very existence of these often diametrically

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opposed perspectives, proves the point that differences and tensions persist at the heart of the

Party.

See Appendix "II.2' for results of Cluster manager survey.

4.4 Campaign Organization

There was a strong view coming from the constituencies as well as the leadership that campaign

organization from the centre was seriously flawed. There were too many managers and no one was

clearly in charge. The Party was very late in setting up an administrative apparatus, which in the

end was never able to fully manage the elections from the centre. Candidate selection in the

months leading up to the election was slow and often poorly managed, leading to public brawls

and wrong choices in some instances. The enumeration and re-verification exercises had not gone

well and the Party as a whole was not on top of the new EOJ process of continual enumeration.

Vin Lawrence was often identified by name and his absence was felt. Unlike when Vin was in

charge, the typical narrative goes, the ship appeared to have more than one captain and unfocused

decision-making and action were the result.

4.5 Trafigura

High on most lists among senior Party Officers was the notion that the 2006 Trafigura affair was

critical in tarnishing the party's chances. Coming out of the Presidential elections the party was

unassailable in the polls and would have won an election handily. It was felt that the affair was

handled badly and the persons at the centre were not sufficiently sidelined from the Party's

business and life. After Trafigura, the popularity of both the Leader and the Party plummeted. The

fact of being in power for eighteen years and thus the foundation for the powerful slogan ‘time for

a change' re-emerged. The Party after the post-election honeymoon was once again vulnerable as

the New Year began.

4.6 Timing of the Elections

There is a broad perception, perhaps consensus, that the timing of the election played a major role

in the defeat. There are two views; the previously mentioned one is that the election should have

been held in 2006 before Trafigura and this would have ensured victory. The second view is that

given the second 2007 budget presentation and the boost in the polls that followed, after the huge

Half Way Tree election announcement meeting, a date called for the end of July would still have

led to victory. Late August carried the nation back to school and into the hurricane season. The

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extended period also allowed the JLP's advantage of significantly greater financial resources to

have an even greater effect on the result. Further, the artificial break around

Emancipation/Independence threw the entire campaign out of stride. In the end, Hurricane Dean

did come and the Government's tepid response to relief and apparent prevarication on a new date,

served to further undermine support for the Party.

4.7 Philosophy and Direction

A related cluster of comments from across the spectrum and directed more at the Party, though

with reference to the campaign itself, suggest that the Party is in danger of losing its way. There is

the talk of the death of voluntarism in the Party; the all-too-frequent association of younger Party

members with alleged financial irregularities; the failure to develop and implement a determined

policy to win young people; the absence of a philosophy, or even a set of guiding principles

appropriate to the twenty first century; the need for a Party School, as functioned in the nineteen

eighties; and critically, the need to breathe new life into the Group structure. Broadly summarized,

there is a strong perception coming from within that the PNP has lost, or is losing its soul. But

herein lays the rub. The very existence of a healthy body of critical opinion is the best indicator

that despite the obvious truth in many of these comments, all is certainly not lost and there is cause

for hope.

4.8 Leadership

The clear view of the majority is that with any other leader, the Party would have done much

worse in the General Elections. When Campaign Managers were asked 'what was the major

positive component in the election campaign?' the largest response, some 71.4% felt that a visit

from the party leader was ‘extremely effective'. A further 14.3% felt it had some effect. When

Cluster Managers and Party Workers were asked what impact the Party Leader had on the

constituency campaign, 77.8% were very positive and a further 16.7% positive. This compares with

5.6% and 38.9% who felt that a visit from Vice Presidents was, respectively, very positive or

positive.

There was a view that having lost the election the leadership should change, but this was in the

minority. This clear indication of the continuing existence of a popular mandate for the incumbent

21

Leader did not, however, prevent the expression of a variety of implicit and explicit criticisms of

the Leader and, more generally, the top leadership.

Apart from the error in the election timing, there was the view that the road plan for Portia was illconceived.

Too many repeat trips were made to constituencies that were un-winnable, while others

with real possibilities had no visits at all. Portia's trips started too late in the day and often reached

the destination long after the crowd had already dissipated. The insistence on meeting and greeting

people individually reduced the number of people who could be reached, as compared to more

emphasis on spot meetings.

The overemphasis on the Leader, others argued, undermined the traditional role of collective

leadership in the campaign. In the past, a number of leaders would spread out and thus maximize

coverage, whereas in the 2007 campaign, the only real draw was the Leader. Some of these

comments have to do with campaigning and leadership style, and are debateable. Others suggest a

genuine concern and desire to reinstate more collective forms of campaign and party leadership

that are perceived to be threatened.

In summary, the view of the clear majority is that the Presidential election is over and, with the

narrow loss of the General Elections, Portia Simpson Miller is the legitimate leader of the PNP.

However, for Simpson Miller's leadership to be a success it requires compromises on all sides and

for everyone to put the interests of the Party first. This is the only approach that will help to avoid

a long period in the political wilderness.

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5.0 THE EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS

5.1 The JLP Campaign.

The JLP conducted a superior campaign which benefited in no small measure from the adaptation

of electioneering techniques developed by the PNP. The JLP won in the national media with

superior jingles, attack advertisements, more extensive coverage and far more extensive

paraphernalia, in particular shirts and armbands. The JLP was also able to decisively win the

financing battle with what many felt was an unprecedented war chest of money. This was used for

a lavish media campaign but also to cover the island with billboards. Comrades in many

constituencies pointed to the widespread buying of votes by the JLP (a common method of

distribution was the folded JLP tee-shirt with $1,000 or more inside), and instances of PNP

supporters being paid amounts of $5,000 and upwards not to vote. Greater research will have to

explain why the Private Sector deserted the Party in large numbers, despite being the collective

beneficiary of so many programmes and enjoying over a decade of sustained profitability brought

about by the deregulation of the economy and macroeconomic stability.

5.2 Violence

There is a strong feeling coming from certain constituencies that violence continues to play a

critical if under-reported role in national elections. Described as "surgical violence", it takes the

form of targeting violence against critical PNP strongholds in marginal constituencies close to

Election Day, to intimidate or demoralize voters. Examples of this were:

(i) the drive-by shootings of the candidate's campaign vehicle at a bar in Georges Valley

(Central Manchester) which killed four Comrades on the Friday night before the election,

followed by

(ii) a further shooting of two Comrades of the leading PNP family in Comfort (Central

Manchester) late in the night on the eve of the election,

(iii) a spate of shootings in August Town (East St. Andrew) which led to numerous PNP

voters leaving the community shortly before Election Day,

(iv) widespread shooting and roadblocks in several communities in West Central St.

Andrew on the Sunday night before Election Day which carried on right up to the opening

of the polls, and

23

(v) sustained violence against PNP communities in South-East St. Andrew. In other

instance there was intimidation, where strange men appeared and made threats or simply

drove around in cars, which proved effective in frightening many people (particularly in

rural areas).

5.3 The Voters List and the EOJ.

There are strong and persistent views that there were real problems with the Voters List. The most

common complaints are that many people were re-verified but there names did not end up on the

final Voters List, and that the List given out by the EOJ in the run-up to the elections (on which

the Party canvassed and the Voters Guides were prepared) was altered in the final List by the

removal of the names of numerous PNP supporters and the shifting of supporters to other polling

divisions. There were also complaints that the List that PNP candidates and their agents had was

different from what was in the black book; that people who had migrated and been struck off the

list reappeared.

A strongly held view among Comrades on the ground is that the EOJ was biased in favour of the

JLP, a perception that was strengthened by some of public remarks made by the Director of

Elections (e.g. his remark that all JLP candidates were lawfully nominated, notwithstanding the

constitutional issue). What is, however, also accepted is that the PNP effort at enumeration was

inadequate the Party dropped the ball during the Presidential election and its aftermath, while the

JLP was doing detailed enumeration work). It appears that the Party has not yet come to grips with

putting in place mechanisms to cope effectively with the relatively new system of continuous

enumeration.

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6.0 THE CAMPAIGN

In an election such as this that turned out to be remarkably close despite the expectations and

predictions of certain analysts, pollsters and some members of the public, general factors cannot

give the entire picture.

We therefore determined to do a more detailed study of a number of constituencies where the

results were interesting, unusual and hopefully would reveal more insights and details than what

the general picture showed. A sample of 12 constituencies was decided upon to represent most if

not all of the factors that were at play and influenced the outcome of the elections.

These were: NW St. Ann

Western St. Mary

Eastern St. Andrew

South East St. Andrew

West Central St. Andrew

South East St. Catherine

North Clarendon

North Central Clarendon

Central Manchester

South East St. Elizabeth

East Hanover

West Central St. James

We were unable to do any work in Western St. Mary, North & North Central Clarendon and South

East St. Elizabeth. However the total increased to 11 after we had a meeting with campaign

managers and workers representing South, South Central and Central St. Catherine.

Colin Fagan won in South East St. Catherine, despite the problem of the toll road and the

determination of the JLP to win that seat; Peter Bunting won in Central Manchester, despite the

party trailing in the polls up until his entry in the constituency in May, 2007; Trevor Munroe lost in

Eastern St Andrew, despite his positive poll results leading up to the election; D. K. Duncan pulled

off a narrow victory in East Hanover, getting 878 more votes for the PNP than in 2002, despite his

age & returning to active politics after years of semi-retirement. Francis Tulloch returned to

politics as well and got 1236 more votes than the PNP did in 2002, yet lost the seat.

Patrick Roberts lost in West Central St. Andrew, "the war zone" even after getting 439 more votes

than in 2002. Maxine Henry-Wilson won with a reduced majority after an amazing campaign

25

against one of politics' most violent prone candidates. Sharon Hay-Webster increased her majority

by 1663 in South Central St. Catherine after having a well managed campaign. Natalie Neita

Headley increased the PNP vote in E C St Catherine by 1347 votes, yet had no money. Michael

Whittingham, in North West St Ann was ahead at one stage according to an Anderson poll; then a

massive infusion of money seemed to have turned the tables on a possible PNP win.

Apart from these detailed reviews we know that Bobby Pickersgill recovered and won his seat in

North West St. Catherine and Roger Clarke won an outstanding victory in Central Westmoreland.

Some of the main reasons for these victories were:

i. Winning candidates walked all over their constituencies, from house to house,

including JLP houses

ii. They worked tirelessly from morning to night, day after day. Colin Fagan said he

"walked off three pairs of shoes" in the campaign. Natalie Neita Headley "walked her

constituency for 18 months". Peter Bunting had little sleep for weeks.

iii. They had well managed campaigns and a team of dedicated and committed,

experienced workers in the main.

iv. They were good, credible candidates that were respected and appreciated in their

constituencies

v. Good organizational strategies and effective canvasses were carried out and the

election day tasks were reasonably well done

vi. Love for and the presence of the Party Leader in the constituency.

Some of the main reasons for not winning were:

i. Did not target and capture sufficient young voters

ii. Constituency organization was weak and there was an appreciable degree of dis-unity as

well.

iii. The campaign strategy was not well orchestrated or managed and communication was

a problem in the constituency as well as with party central

iv. Money overpowered almost everything else

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v. Violence, selective and targeted and intimidation also had great impact

vi. The confusion over the final voter's lists and inefficiency of the EOJ turned away many

voters.

vii. The impressive and relentless JLP advertising campaign contrasted with the weak and

unimpressive PNP advertising strategy.

Many other important reasons for the outcome of the elections are expressed in the detailed,

attached commentaries on these constituencies. It is however very interesting to look at a few of

the recommendations made for the future operation of the party by the workers, managers and

young people with whom we spoke.

The future

Rebuild the unity within the party. The party has to work as a coordinated team to place

the PNP at the forefront of the National Movement for the development of Jamaica.

Specifically:

i. more grass roots connections with the people

ii. the establishment of a party school and a comprehensive political education

programme designed to deal with the philosophy and practice of the party

iii. a new youth programme as the Youth Organisation has become irrelevant to the needs

of young people and the party at the same time.

iv. Total restructuring and reorganization of the party so that it can function effectively as

a modern organization using 21st century practices and management techniques

v. Have to inculcate a new set of values and redefine the purpose of the party as

voluntarism is dead and mercenary practices are increasing

vi. More voter education and training especially because of continuous registration

vii. Improved candidate selection process and better MP representation

viii. More democracy in the party, with a new role for groups and to create a new type of

party worker, trained, educated and officially recognized within the organization

27

A successful campaign is not captured in a single statement or act but there are commonalities that

we observed:

i. A good candidate who is respected on the ground

ii. A united and hardworking party membership with knowledge of the voters and a

willingness to work outside and beyond the election

iii. An effective well managed organization in place to conduct an effective canvass,

scientific assessments of the voters, to interface with and have house to house contact

with the residents and for the fullest involvement in the enumeration exercises.

iv. The participation, particularly in constituencies with varying social groupings of party

representatives from a variety of social backgrounds

v. The recognition of and respect for dedicated party workers who form the backbone of

the party's successful achievements.

vi. A cause to fight for and a reason to win.

See Appendix II in total appendix II.4 in particular for content of discussions at constituency

sessions held with constituency workers and cluster managers.

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7.0 THE WAY FORWARD

7.1 Knowing where we are going: Unity and Philosophy

The overarching question facing the People's National Party today is how to reunite the leaders,

members and supporters around a common platform, based on a shared philosophy, common

sense of direction and the role of the Party in the future of the nation. The problem of distrust

and consequent disunity associated with the 2006 Presidential election is not going to heal itself. A

determined programme needs to be implemented that will provide the requisite spaces for a full

and frank exchange of differences. The act of re-establishing frayed personal relationships is,

however, only one aspect of the problem. Genuine unity must be built upon the foundations of a

shared philosophy, a broadly consensual set of beliefs and a common set of policies arising from

these beliefs. ‘What', as one respondent asked ‘is the transcendent purpose of the PNP?'

In the period after its formation and up until the 1950s, the PNP was an anti-colonial movement;

indeed, it is reasonable to suggest that it was the vehicle of the national movement that struggled in

a peculiarly Anglo-Caribbean sense for independence. In the seventies, Democratic Socialism was

the name given to a broad-based movement headed by the PNP aimed at redressing the deeply

entrenched and unequal social and economic underpinnings of post-colonial Jamaica. What are the

new principles that will unite the majority of Jamaicans in a programme of social, political and

economic advancement appropriate to the twenty first century? What will be the goals and

objectives that arise from these principles? The question of Party unity cannot thus be approached

in the abstract, but must coalesce around a set of clearly defined principles and further elaborated

objectives. Then, we will truly be able to say with one voice ‘We know where we are going!'

The following proposals flow from this.

7.2 The Unity Conference

i. A series of retreats involving the President, Vice Presidents and senior officers of the

Party should be convened to resolve differences, discuss matters of leadership, unity

and the way forward for the PNP. The present appraisal report might be used as one

available document, though the documents from earlier appraisal exercises, the

Principles and Objectives, the Party programme and other appropriate documents might

provide the basis for an informed discussion.

29

ii. The establishment of a Commission with the purpose of reviewing and redrafting the

Principles and Objectives of the PNP. The new Draft Principles and Objectives would

be circulated for study and comments at all levels throughout the Party.

iii. The convening of a special conference entitled, perhaps, ‘the Unity Conference' in

which the philosophy and the aims and objectives of the Party in the twenty first

century would be the main items on the agenda.

7.3 Philosophy and Core Values

The era of globalisation and self-centred materialism has re-enforced the need for the Party to reexamine

its philosophy and identify core values to guide its decision-making and actions, which

will resonate with contemporary Jamaica at all levels. A Charter of Principles should be developed for

adoption at the Unity Conference, and to provide a platform for the Party's role as leader of the

next phase in the National Movement. The Charter of Principles should:

i. Emphasize the Party's commitment to policies that recognise and seek to redress

Jamaica's historical imbalances and inequities, in the quest for a just and fair society.

ii. Reaffirm the Party's commitment to democracy and the deepening of its application at

both the national and local levels.

iii. Promote an economy that provides opportunity for all, but particularly the poor and

those traditionally on the margins

iv. Underline the party's commitment to a sustainable economy, in the context of the

imminent threat to life as we know it that is posed by unsustainable practices associated

with global warming

v. Reaffirm and build on the Party's role in supporting and advancing legislation in favour

of greater gender equality

vi. Constantly focus on developing practical measures to address the social challenges of

the day in a way that has the broadest beneficial impact

vii. Embrace and celebrate Jamaica's unique capacity for tolerance, love and forgiveness

viii. Recognise Jamaica as a place where commercial initiative and entrepreneurship is

encouraged

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ix. Promote a society where acts of good citizenship are expected, recognised and

encouraged at all levels

x. Promote an economy where foreign capital is welcomed as long as it is respectful of

our laws, people and environment

xi. Recognise that roughly half of Jamaica's population is resident abroad and that there is

therefore the need to build the closest possible economic and political relationships

with the Diaspora

xii. Continue the Party's tradition of promoting our Caribbean Community, particularly in

the context of the difficult options facing small states in a globalised world

xiii. Adopt the principle of Accountability for Performance as a core value within the Party

xiv. Recognize administrative competence and capacity for hard work as core competences

for organisational posts in the Party

xv. Adopt the principle of Accountability for Financial Integrity, as a core value within the

Party, requiring transparency and honesty in dealings with public resources

xvi. Recognise that corruption is a malignant condition against which the Party must at all

times be vigilant, and encourage a culture of financial probity and integrity among all

holders of offices within the Party

xvii. Recognise the need for the Party to continuously review its economic and social

philosophies in a dynamic and evolving world, with the objective of always developing

workable frameworks for giving practical expression to the Party's core values.

7.4 Accountability for Performance

To give practical expression to this core value, the Party should develop and establish a system of

annual performance reviews of holders of posts in the Party's organisational structure. This

approach should be encouraged downstream through the Regional, Divisional and Group

structures. When the Party is in power, it should apply this system to its representatives holding

governmental positions.

The Party should also consider allocating relevant Portfolios to specific Vice Presidents and

Deputy General Secretaries, to clearly establish areas of responsibility and facilitate the

measurement of performance.

31

7.5 Incumbency & Succession Planning

The Party should recognise the dangers of institutionalising personalities and reinforcing the

dominance of incumbency. A culture of upward mobility and the introduction of "new blood"

should be encouraged. The Party might wish to consider the adoption of Term Limits of three

consecutive terms for all Party offices (other than the Party leader while the Party is in power), and

implement such Term Limits with no grandfathering of incumbents. The Term Limits rule could

be modified to provide for resumed eligibility after the end of one term from the expiration of the

Term Limit.

The Party should concentrate on succession planning as a priority. Young people need to see a

career path in politics to become interested in it. Openings, opportunities and promotions have to

be created to keep interest high amongst members, to keep the Party invigorated and to overcome

staleness and a lack of enthusiasm for its ideals. Retired officers and members of the Party who

have the required experience and appropriate skills should be co-opted to sit on Party commissions

and committees or be deployed as consultants and advisors to the Party. More experienced

members of the Party have to be recognized and encouraged to train, advise and pass on their

skills and knowledge to younger Party members and supporters to maintain the party's successful

growth.

A new culture has to be fashioned whereby all members of the party are encouraged to understudy

and to replace party leaders as a matter of course and not as a matter of challenging anyone's

authority or position.

7.6 Internal Affairs/Disciplinary matters

The role of the Disciplinary Committee should be expanded and re-invented as a mechanism for

encouraging internal unity and cohesion within the Party. It might be called the Committee for

Internal Affairs and Disciplinary matters. Its mandate would include:

i. Building consensus around the Party's Core Values

ii. Encouraging mutual support among Party officers at all levels

iii. Identifying violations of core values and, where appropriate, imposing proportionate

consequences on transgressors

32

iv. Ensuring that potential embarrassments to the Party's image and reputation are

identified early and managed appropriately to mitigate political damage.

Any recognized Party organ might also refer disputes among Comrades at the local level to this

Committee for resolution. This Committee should be empowered to issue Party Directives which

are binding on Party members. Retired senior officers of the Party, who have the required

experience and appropriate skills, should be co-opted to sit on this Committee.

7.7 Party Structures

It is time to re-think the nature and purpose of groups in the Party. There is a widespread feeling

that the group structure is in decline and needs to be brought back to the fore. What should the

Party group in the twenty first century look like? How might it address questions of community

advancement and economic empowerment in ways that might attract young people from all social

strata? How might the group structure be utilised to encourage the flow of ideas, criticisms and

recommendations from Party workers at the divisional, constituency and community levels? This

might be an additional item sufficiently important to occupy thoughts at the ‘Unity Conference'. At

minimum, all group members should be enumerated to vote at national elections.

Other items of critical importance include:

i. The Party secretariat needs to re-examine its role and methods of communicating with

party members and the public so as to erase the feeling amongst many "that dem own the

Party".

ii. The Party leader's support staff needs to be strengthened, reconfigured and take up a new

role of managing the use of the leader's time more effectively, see to proper scheduling,

and prepare for the leaders necessary needs and requirements whilst working for the Party.

The Party Leader's staff must ensure that all requests for appointments, correspondence

and meetings are dealt with speedily and professionally. The road programmes and

campaign activities of the Party leadership need to be more professionally coordinated and

managed.

iii. The General Secretary should be employed full time on Party work, and not at the same

time be an MP and/or Minister.

33

iv. There should be a single Campaign Director of National Elections, appointed by the

Executive to be in charge of the Party's entire campaign organisation, to create a clear path

of decision-making authority.

v. The Treasurer should be primarily the Party's chief accounting officer, and should be

buttressed by the Party Fundraising Committee (of which the Treasurer would be a

member).

vi. The present bifurcation of the PNPYO and Patriots needs to be rethought. Perhaps the

Party needs to abandon both and establish new look youth organizations with fresh

credentials and a clean break with the recent past. The Party might wish to consider

establishing a PNP Students Association specifically to focus on the recruitment and

mobilisation of tertiary-level students; and a PNP Young Professionals Association to

focus on the recruitment and mobilisation of young professionals and entrepreneurs. At

least one senior Party member should be on the executive of each of these organisations,

to provide appropriate guidance and mentoring and to encourage adherence to the Party's

Core Values.

vii. The Women's Movement, which is moribund, also needs to be reinvented. The PNPWM,

which was in the vanguard to implement the Maternity Leave Law and other path breaking

legislation in the seventies, is now a shadow of its former self. It should be a catalyst for

recruiting and mobilising sympathetic volunteers who will actively support:

community programmes which empower women;

new legislation and activism to address the severe gender imbalances that

continue in Jamaica; and

campaign committees at the national, constituency and divisional levels in

national and local election campaigns. The head of the Women's Movement

should, as in the past, be an active national spokesperson for the Party on

gender affairs.

7.8 Enumeration of Supporters

It is apparent that the Party's management of the EOJ's recently introduced continuous

enumeration process is ineffective, with the result that many PNP supporters were not on the

voters lists for the recent General Election. Enumeration of supporters is a crucial factor in

34

election outcomes, and the Party needs to put in place the necessary machinery to ensure the

maximum possible level of enumeration of supporters on a continuous basis. An officer (perhaps

one of the Deputy General Secretaries) should be allocated specific responsibility for overall

management of the Party's island-wide continuous enumeration effort, with Regional Chairmen (or

Vice Presidents, if our proposal in 7.4 above is adopted). Further, each MP/Caretaker should be

given specific enumeration targets and required to submit regular enumeration reports.

7.9 Internal Management Capability

There should be an urgent review of the management and administrative structures of the Party,

with a view to improving their efficiency and effectiveness. Modern management structures,

processes and practices should be adopted, and the use of technology needs to be strengthened.

The physical plant at Party Headquarters is in disrepair and needs to be substantially redesigned

and renovated:

i. to streamline and maximise the use of the available space,

ii. to promote an image consistent with that of a modern, forward-thinking

organisation, and

iii. to allow for the efficient execution of work activities.

7.10 Party Elections

i. Nominations to all officer positions in the Party should be received 90 days before

Annual Conference.

ii. There should be clear limits on campaign expenditure, to avoid "donor exhaustion"

negatively affecting the Party's financing for subsequent General Elections. This will

also set the pattern that the Party advocates at the national level.

iii. Funds for internal campaigns should be raised centrally by the Party and disbursed to

candidates in a transparent manner, to ensure equal financial treatment of candidates.

iv. There should be no national media campaigning, as this has the proven capacity to

inflate the stakes, ‘wash dirty linen in public', create deep resentments and provide

limitless ammunition for the opposition.

v. The existing Code of Conduct should be reviewed and adjusted to the extent necessary

to be consistent with these recommendations.

35

vi. The Constitution should require the Committee of Internal Affairs to play an active

role in monitoring the campaign for compliance with the Code of Conduct and issuing

appropriate directives on a timely basis to candidates found to be in breach.

vii. Candidates should be required to promptly and publicly disassociate themselves from

breaches of the Code of Conduct on the part of their supporters.

7.11 Candidate Selection

The system of candidate selection needs to be improved:

i. There should be a Director of Internal Elections, with responsibility for developing

and managing internal election processes and ensuring the integrity of all internal Party

elections;

ii. The emphasis should be on finding a speedy resolution to conflicts at the constituency

level, followed by a structured process of reconciliation to achieve the fullest possible

buy-in from all contenders and supporters.

iii. The timeframe for the appointment of candidates needs to be truncated, to allow for

early selection and the longest possible time for the newly selected candidates to work

on the ground.

iv. A manual for new candidates needs to be developed, setting out the best practices of

constituency organisation and campaign management.

v. No constituency should be left for a prolonged period without a candidate.

vi. No candidate, caretaker, MP or councillor should be permitted to abandon a

constituency without a period of smooth transition.

7.12 Fundraising

i. A Party Fundraising Committee should be established, chaired by the Treasurer.

ii. It should be mandated to pursue strategic and coordinated fundraising initiatives on a

continual basis to fund the Party's activities and campaigns.

iii. Sympathetic private sector representatives with acknowledged fundraising capacity

should be co-opted to the Party Fundraising Committee.

36

iv. There should be a Committee member whose responsibility is to foster fundraising

relationships with sympathetic overseas political movements and Diaspora groups.

v. The engagement of a professional fundraiser, perhaps working on a commission basis,

should be explored.

vi. Each constituency should have at least one person, who is a trained grants proposal

writer. S/he would assist combined groups who are registered as a Community Based

Organisation to access funds from foundations etc.

vii. There should be an established linkage between the Party Fundraising Committee and

the Party officer in charge of Media/PR (see 7.15 below), with the mandate of

promoting cohesion and avoiding incompatibilities between the Party's imaging in the

media and the Party's ongoing financing efforts.

7.13 Political Education & Training

The Party must re-establish a programme for Continuing Political Education & Training, and the

Party should establish the post of Director of Continuing Political Education within the

Constitution of the Party with responsibility for developing and maintaining the programme.

Appropriate person(s) should be charged with the task of assisting the Director with the

development of a curriculum including, perhaps, courses such as:

• The Constitution, Rules and Procedures of the Peoples National Party
• Core Principles of the Peoples National Party
• Achievements of the Peoples National Party in Government
• History of Jamaican Politics from 1938 to date
• Ethics in Government
• Ethics of Political Campaigning
• The Caribbean in the Global Political Economy
• Establishing and Maintaining Effective Structures of Political Organisation
• Maximizing Available Resources in Political Campaigns
• Political Public Relations and Media Management

37

Guest tutors/lecturers (and authors of appropriate courses) would include experts at critical

aspects of political organisation. The Party would formally certify the Continuing Political

Education courses. All officers of the Party would be required to pursue the courses until

certified, and qualification of a Certified Political Organiser (CPO) would eventually become a

requirement in order to hold an office, serve as campaign manager, cluster manager and all other

levels within the Party. The completion of refresher courses every 5 years should be encouraged

among all Party officers.

7.14 Internal Communications

The Rising Sun should be revived as a Party communication tool to:

i. counter adverse propaganda, media hostility and negative publicity

ii. inform Comrades at all levels of the Party (including, via the Groups, the communities

all around Jamaica) of immediate and ongoing issues of the day, the Party's position on

those issues and the arguments in support of the Party's position

iii. highlight the weaknesses of opposing views (including race/class or other biases,

double standards, ironies, logical flaws and errors of information)

The publication should include cartoons, jokes and other potent ancillary weapons of political

competition, and some non-political content of a developmental/morale-building nature. It

should also be a useful tuition/revision tool in the Continuing Political Education process. The

Party should encourage and utilize telecom and web-based methods of distribution of information

within the Party, from the Central to the Local levels and vice versa, and undertake a programme

to improve capacities in this regard. An initial objective should be to reach the point where each

Group has a computer with internet/email access.

7.15 Media Relations

The Party needs to establish mechanisms for handling the Media and promoting effective Public

Relations. The Party should establish the post of Director of Media Relations, with responsibility

for fostering and maintaining good relationships with the media and managing the flow of

information from the Party to the media. The Director should be supported by a Committee of

sympathetic External Media Experts, formally appointed by the Party, who provide the Director

with guidance and advice on an ongoing basis.

38

7.16 International Relations

The Party should review and develop strategies for enhancing relationships with compatible

overseas political organisations. There is a perception that in recent times, some of these

relationships have been neglected, to the Party's detriment. The post of Director of International

Political Relations should be established within the Party, with the mandate of fostering ongoing

technical assistance and funding support from these sources.

7.17 Recruitment

The Party needs to address recruitment from all sectors of the society, but priority must be on the

young, the middle class, the stable working class, young farmers and professionals. The Party

should have a committee, headed ideally by a member of the NEC, with the specific purpose of

continually identifying and recruiting qualified and talented young people from all walks of society

and from the Diaspora. From these efforts a ‘Skills bank' should be developed, which must also

include any volunteers who have come forward to provide assistance for the Party. The skills bank

should extend to the Diaspora for maximum benefit.

7.18 Security and Intelligence

The use of "surgical violence" against the Party in the recent General Elections shows that this has

been fine-tuned as a deliberate and effective strategy to intimidate Party workers and supporters,